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Abstract: We consider a problem of numerical construction of a Stackelberg solution in a
differential game with closed-loop information structure and terminal player payoffs. It is divided
into two subproblems: the problem of computing of so-called “admissible” motions and the
optimization problem on the set of admissible motions. We focus on the latter problem and
consider two approaches: enumeration of the follower player payoffs and enumeration of the
leader player payoffs. Algorithms implementing both approaches are presented and tested on a
model system.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We consider a positional differential Stackelberg game
with a hierarchy of two players: “the leader” and “the
follower”. The leader chooses and announces a strategy to
the follower before the game and the follower then chooses
a rational response. This construction allows us to pass
from a game problem to an optimal control problem.
There are numerous works devoted to solutions in differ-
ential Stackelberg games, most of which consider either
linear-quadratic games or games with open-loop infor-
mation structure. A survey of classical settings and ap-
proaches to solving problems of these types can be found
in Başar and Olsder (1999).
In this paper we consider a different class of games. Namely
positional (closed-loop information structure) games with
terminal player payoffs. In order to define player strate-
gies and motions we follow the setting of the theory
of (zero-sum) positional differential games developed by
N.N. Krasovskii and his scientific school (see Krasovskii
and Subbotin (1988)) and the theoretical apparatus for
non-zero-sum games from Kleimenov (1993). This work
continues Osipov (2007) and Kuvshinov and Osipov (2018)
and is closely related to the latter. Here we refine the pro-
posed numerical algorithm and provide new computation
results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief
description of the problem statement. Section 3 defines
admissible motions. Section 4 describes an approach based
upon follower payoff enumeration, or globally maximizing
leader payoff as a function of follower payoff. Section
5 describes an alternative approach based upon leader
payoff enumeration. Section 6 provides some numerical
computation results on how the two approaches compare
to each other for a model system.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Let the dynamics of the differential game be described by
the equation
ẋ(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t), v(t)), x(t0) = x0, t ∈ [t0, ϑ], (1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is a phase vector, ϑ > t0 is a fixed
final time, when the player payoffs are evaluated. Controls
u(t) ∈ P and v(t) ∈ Q are handled by the leader and the
follower respectively. Sets P and Q are compacts in some
vector spaces.
Player payoffs are defined as
Ii = σi(x(ϑ)), i = 1, 2. (2)
The leader maximizes I1 while the follower maximizes I2.
LetG ⊂ [t0, ϑ]×Rn be a compact set such that (t0, x0) ∈ G
and every motion of (1) beginning in G lies in G. We
assume the following conditions to hold.
(1) Both players have full information about the system
and the current state x(t).
(2) The function f : G× P ×Q → Rn is continuous.
(3) There is L > 0 such that
‖f(t, x′, u, v)− f(t, x′′, u, v)‖ ≤ L‖x′ − x′′‖
for any (t, x′) ∈ G, (t, x′′) ∈ G, u ∈ P and v ∈ Q.
(4) There is κ > 0 such that ‖f(t, x, u, v)‖ ≤ κ(1 + ‖x‖)
for any (t, x) ∈ G, u ∈ P and v ∈ Q.









sf(t, x, u, v).
(6) The set { f(t, x, u, v) | u ∈ P, v ∈ Q } is convex for
each (t, x) ∈ G.
(7) Functions σi : Rn → R, i = 1, 2, are continuous.
Following Kleimenov (1993) we define (pure) leader strat-
egy as a pair of functions U = (u(t, x, ε), β1(ε)), u : G ×
(0,+∞) → P , β1 : (0,+∞) → (0,+∞). The function
β1(ε) is continuous, monotone and limε→0 β1(ε) = 0.
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The follower strategy is defined analogously as a pair
V = (v(t, x, ε), β2(ε)).
Functions βi, i = 1, 2, determine upper bounds for time
steps used by the players when building broken line (ap-
proximate) motions. Here we will skip description of the
corresponding limit motions, details may be found in
Krasovskii and Subbotin (1988) and Kleimenov (1993).
The following definition is schematic. Denote V (U) a
follower strategy that maximizes I2 (2) when the leader
follows the strategy U . Denote US a leader strategy that
maximizes I1 when the follower follows the strategy V
S =
V (US). Stackelberg solutions are defined then as pairs of
strategies (US , V S).
We call two different solutions “equivalent” if both players’
payoffs on these solutions are the same.
3. ADMISSIBLE MOTIONS
Let us introduce an auxiliary zero-sum positional differen-
tial game Γ2. The dynamics of this game is defined by (1).
Here the follower maximizes payoff I2 (2) while the leader
minimizes I2. Due to Krasovskii and Subbotin (1988) it is
known that Γ2 has a “universal saddle point”
(u(2)(t, x, ε), v(2)(t, x, ε)) (3)
and continuous value γ2(t, x) where (t, x) ∈ G is considered
an initial position. The word “universal” means that these
controls are optimal for any position (t, x) ∈ G taken as
an initial position.
Problem 1. Find measurable controls u : [t0, ϑ] → P and
v : [t0, ϑ] → Q maximizing I1 given that the corresponding
solution x(t) of (1) satisfies
γ2(t, x(t)) ≤ γ2(ϑ, x(ϑ)) = σ2(x(ϑ)), t ∈ [t0, ϑ]. (4)
Theorem 2. (Theorem 1.10 (Kleimenov, 1993, p. 35)). Let
all assumptions listed above hold then solutions of prob-
lem 1 exist.
Let u∗(t) and v∗(t) be some player controls and let
x∗(t) be the corresponding solution of (1). Now con-
sider the player strategies U0 = (u0(t, x, ε), β01(ε)), V
0 =
(v0(t, x, ε), β02(ε)), where
u0(t, x, ε) =
{
u∗(t) if ‖x− x∗(t)‖ < εϕ(t),
u(2)(t, x, ε) otherwise,
v0(t, x, ε) =
{
v∗(t) if ‖x− x∗(t)‖ < εϕ(t),
v(2)(t, x, ε) otherwise.
(5)
Here ϕ(t) is some estimate of accumulated broken line
error. Functions β0i (·), i = 1, 2, are to be selected in order
to prevent violation of the condition ‖x − x∗(t)‖ < εϕ(t)
when both players are faithfully following motion x∗(t).
Leader’s strategy U0 may be interpreted as follows. Follow
motion x∗(t) using u∗(t). If at some t∗ ∈ [t0, ϑ) the follower
refuses to follow x∗(t) switch to the “penalty strategy”
u(2)(t, x, ε) (3) in order to minimize the follower’s payoff,
which then can’t be greater than
max{ γ2(t∗, x) | (t∗, x) ∈ G ∧ ‖x− x∗(t∗)‖ ≤ εϕ(t∗) }.
A summary of theorems 1.11, 1.12, 1.14 and 1.15 from
(Kleimenov, 1993, pp. 36–40) may be presented in the form
of the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let all assumptions listed above hold. Sup-
pose that controls u∗(t) and v∗(t) constitute a solution
of problem 1. Then a pair of strategies (U0, V 0) (5) is
a Stackelberg solution. Inversely: for every Stackelberg
solution there exists an equivalent Stackelberg solution in
the form (5) where controls u∗(t) and v∗(t) constitute a
solution of problem 1.
Thus we can search Stackelberg solutions in the form (5).
In order to do this we have to solve problem 1. A pair of
possible controls u : [t0, ϑ] → P and v : [t0, ϑ] → Q such
that the corresponding solution x(t) of (1) satisfies the
inequality (4) is “admissible controls”. The motion x(t)
is “admissible motion”. Any motion produced by some
Stackelberg solution is an admissible motion maximizing
the leader’s payoff I1 (2).
Define sets
M ci = {x ∈ Rn | σi(x) ≥ c }, i = 1, 2. (6)
Then a set
W c2 = { (t, x) ∈ G | γ2(t, x) ≥ c }
is a “maximal stable bridge” in a pursuit-evasion game
(for details see Krasovskii and Subbotin (1988)) with dy-
namics (1) and the target set M c2 (6) where the follower
tries to steer x(ϑ) into M c2 , while the leader opposes.
There are a variety of works on (approximate or exact)
computation of maximal stable bridges. To list a few:
Ganebny et al. (2012) and Kamneva and Patsko (2016)
(linear dynamics), Tarasyev et al. (1992) (non-linear dy-
namics). Below we assume that we can build W c2 for any
reasonable c ≥ γ2(t0, x0).
In Osipov (2007) inequality (4) was interpreted in terms
of maximal stable bridges in the form of the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. A motion x(t) is admissible if and only if
there exists c ∈ R such that x(ϑ) ∈ M c2 and (t, x(t)) /∈
intW c2 for all t ∈ [t0, ϑ).
4. ENUMERATION OF FOLLOWER PAYOFFS
Denote c2 = γ2(t0, x0) and c2 = max{σ2(x) | (ϑ, x) ∈ G }.
Denote D = {x(ϑ) | x(·) is admissible motion }. So
Dc2 = {x ∈ D | σ2(x) = c2 }, c2 ∈ [c2, c2],
comprises endpoints of all admissible motions providing
the follower payoff c2. Now we may formally introduce the
function
cmax1 (c2) = max{σ1(x) | x ∈ Dc2 }. (7)
This function gives the maximal possible leader payoff
when the follower payoff is fixed to be c2. Now Stackelberg
solution may be found by maximizing cmax1 (c2) on [c2, c2].
But we have to point out that in general:
(1) We do not have an explicit analytic formula repre-
senting cmax1 (c2).
(2) Function cmax1 (c2) is not unimodal.
(3) Function cmax1 (c2) is not Lipschitz continuous (Kara-
sev et al. (2017)).
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when both players are faithfully following motion x∗(t).
Leader’s strategy U0 may be interpreted as follows. Follow
motion x∗(t) using u∗(t). If at some t∗ ∈ [t0, ϑ) the follower
refuses to follow x∗(t) switch to the “penalty strategy”
u(2)(t, x, ε) (3) in order to minimize the follower’s payoff,
which then can’t be greater than
max{ γ2(t∗, x) | (t∗, x) ∈ G ∧ ‖x− x∗(t∗)‖ ≤ εϕ(t∗) }.
A summary of theorems 1.11, 1.12, 1.14 and 1.15 from
(Kleimenov, 1993, pp. 36–40) may be presented in the form
of the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let all assumptions listed above hold. Sup-
pose that controls u∗(t) and v∗(t) constitute a solution
of problem 1. Then a pair of strategies (U0, V 0) (5) is
a Stackelberg solution. Inversely: for every Stackelberg
solution there exists an equivalent Stackelberg solution in
the form (5) where controls u∗(t) and v∗(t) constitute a
solution of problem 1.
Thus we can search Stackelberg solutions in the form (5).
In order to do this we have to solve problem 1. A pair of
possible controls u : [t0, ϑ] → P and v : [t0, ϑ] → Q such
that the corresponding solution x(t) of (1) satisfies the
inequality (4) is “admissible controls”. The motion x(t)
is “admissible motion”. Any motion produced by some
Stackelberg solution is an admissible motion maximizing
the leader’s payoff I1 (2).
Define sets
M ci = {x ∈ Rn | σi(x) ≥ c }, i = 1, 2. (6)
Then a set
W c2 = { (t, x) ∈ G | γ2(t, x) ≥ c }
is a “maximal stable bridge” in a pursuit-evasion game
(for details see Krasovskii and Subbotin (1988)) with dy-
namics (1) and the target set M c2 (6) where the follower
tries to steer x(ϑ) into M c2 , while the leader opposes.
There are a variety of works on (approximate or exact)
computation of maximal stable bridges. To list a few:
Ganebny et al. (2012) and Kamneva and Patsko (2016)
(linear dynamics), Tarasyev et al. (1992) (non-linear dy-
namics). Below we assume that we can build W c2 for any
reasonable c ≥ γ2(t0, x0).
In Osipov (2007) inequality (4) was interpreted in terms
of maximal stable bridges in the form of the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. A motion x(t) is admissible if and only if
there exists c ∈ R such that x(ϑ) ∈ M c2 and (t, x(t)) /∈
intW c2 for all t ∈ [t0, ϑ).
4. ENUMERATION OF FOLLOWER PAYOFFS
Denote c2 = γ2(t0, x0) and c2 = max{σ2(x) | (ϑ, x) ∈ G }.
Denote D = {x(ϑ) | x(·) is admissible motion }. So
Dc2 = {x ∈ D | σ2(x) = c2 }, c2 ∈ [c2, c2],
comprises endpoints of all admissible motions providing
the follower payoff c2. Now we may formally introduce the
function
cmax1 (c2) = max{σ1(x) | x ∈ Dc2 }. (7)
This function gives the maximal possible leader payoff
when the follower payoff is fixed to be c2. Now Stackelberg
solution may be found by maximizing cmax1 (c2) on [c2, c2].
But we have to point out that in general:
(1) We do not have an explicit analytic formula repre-
senting cmax1 (c2).
(2) Function cmax1 (c2) is not unimodal.
(3) Function cmax1 (c2) is not Lipschitz continuous (Kara-
sev et al. (2017)).
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This makes the problem of finding a global maximum of
cmax1 (c2) with arbitrary precision hard (or even unsolvable
in general case).
Of course, we can try any numerical derivative-free scalar
optimization method if we can (approximately) compute
cmax1 (c2). In Osipov (2007) it was done by grid search enu-
merating c2 ≥ c2 with some small step, while cmax1 (c2) was
computed approximately using polygonal approximations
of W c22 and D
c2 with computational geometry procedures
(the case of linear dynamics in plane).
However, in Rn, n > 2, it may be difficult to explicitly
build geometric approximation of Dc2 due to scalability
issues of non-convex polyhedra and software complexity.
Problem 5. Given c1 and c2 find an admissible motion on
which the leader payoff is at least c1 and the follower payoff
is exactly c2.
Assume that we can compute the following function and
the corresponding admissible motion if one exists (in the
case of linear dynamics this can be done using only convex
polyhedra as described in Kuvshinov and Osipov (2018)):
S(c1, c2) =
{
1 if problem 5 has a solution for c1, c2,
0 otherwise.
(8)
Now we can approximate cmax1 (c2) to arbitrary preci-
sion using binary search (Kuvshinov and Osipov (2018),
lemma 1).
Let Ac ⊂ [t0, ϑ] × G be a reachability set of (1) with
phase constraint (t, x(t)) /∈ intW c2 for t ∈ [t0, ϑ). Denote
Ac(t) = {x ∈ Rn | (t, x) ∈ Ac }.
Geometric sense of S(c1, c2) is revealed by lemma 6.
Lemma 6. For c1 ∈ [c1, c1] and c2 ∈ [c2, c2] we have




2 ) ∩Ac2(ϑ) = ∅.
Proof. (⇒) S(c1, c2) = 1 means there is admissible x(t)
such that σ1(x(ϑ)) ≥ c1 and σ2(x(ϑ)) = c2 so x(ϑ) ∈
M c11 ∩ ∂M
c2
2 and x(t) ∈ Ac2(t) due to definition of Ac2 .
That means the set M c11 ∩M
c2
2 ∩Ac2(ϑ) contains at least
x(ϑ) and thus it is not empty. (⇐) Let x∗ ∈ M c11 ∩
M c22 ∩ Ac2(ϑ). Due to definition of Ac2 there is at least
one admissible motion x(t) such that x(ϑ) = x∗. Then we
have σi(x(ϑ)) ≥ ci, i = 1, 2. But due to proposition 4 we
have Ac2 ∩ intW c22 = ∅ so Ac2(ϑ) ∩ intM
c2
2 = ∅ and we
have σ2(x(ϑ)) ≤ c2. That means x(t) solves problem 5 and
S(c1, c2) = 1.
The following algorithm may be proposed as an alternative
way to do grid maximum search. We compute cmax1 (c
i
2) on
a grid with nodes { ci2 }Ni=0 for some N ∈ N. All cmax(ci2)
are evaluated by binary search in lockstep, at each binary
search step all nodes with upper bounds not higher than
the current maximal lower bound are removed.
Algorithm 1. Grid search.
(1) Input: set C = { ci2 }Ni=0 ⊂ [c2, c2], precision parame-
ter tol > 0.
(2) Let lo and hi be dictionaries, mapping numbers to
numbers.
(3) Assign gap ← c1 − c1.
(4) For all c ∈ C:
(a) Assign lo[c] ← c1.
(b) Assign hi[c] ← c1.
(5) While gap > tol:
(a) For all c ∈ C:
(i) Let m = (lo[c] + hi[c])/2.
(ii) If S(m, c) = 1, then lo[c] = m.
(iii) Else hi[c] = m.
(b) Let L = max{ lo[c] | c ∈ C }.
(c) Assign C ← { c ∈ C | hi[c] > L }.
(d) Assign gap ← gap/2.
(6) Let L = max{ lo[c] | c ∈ C }.
(7) Let F = max{ c ∈ C | lo[c] = L }.
(8) Output: payoffs (L,F ).
5. ENUMERATION OF LEADER PAYOFFS
It is possible to determine interval [c1, c1] containing leader
payoff on a Stackelberg solution just analogously to [c2, c2]:
c1 = γ1(t0, x0) where γ1(t, x) is a value function of a zero-
sum game Γ1 where the leader maximizes I1 (2) while the
follower opposes, c1 = max{σ1(x) | (ϑ, x) ∈ G }.
Problem 7. Given some c1 ∈ [c1, c1] find c2 ∈ [c2, c2] such
that S(c1, c2) = 1 (8) or determine that S(c1, c2) = 0 for
all c2 ∈ [c2, c2].
It should be pointed out that S(c1, c2) = 1.
Lemma 8. There is c∗1 ∈ [c1, c1] such that problem 7 has
solution for any c1 ∈ [c1, c∗1] and does not have solutions
for any c1 ∈ (c∗1, c1].
Proof. Admissible motions exist (theorem 2) and contain
a motion providing a Stackelberg solution (theorem 3)
that means that maximum of leader payoff on admissible
motions exist. Let such a motion provide the leader with





2) = 1 for any c1 ∈ [c1, c∗1] (see problem 5) and
S(c1, c2) = 0 for any c1 ∈ (c∗1, c1] and any c2 ∈ [c2, c2].
If we can solve problem 7 then due to lemma 8 we can find
an admissible motion (and hence a solution in form (5)),
on which the leader payoff is arbitrarily close to that on a
Stackelberg solution using binary search.
Denote
cm2 (c1, c2) = max {σ2(x) | x ∈ M
c1
1 ∩Ac2(ϑ) }. (9)
Lemma 9. Let c1 ∈ [c1, c1] and c2 ∈ [c2, c2] are such that
M c11 ∩ Ac2(ϑ) = ∅. Then cm2 (c1, c2) can be approximated
to any given arbitrary precision.
Proof. Let x be an arbitrary point in M c11 ∩Ac2(ϑ), then
σ2(x) ≤ cm2 (c1, c2) ≤ c2. Given some precision ζ > 0 we
can use binary search to find c∗2 ∈ [σ2(x), c2] such that
M c11 ∩M
c∗2




2 ∩Ac2(ϑ) = ∅.
It follows then that cm2 (c1, c2) ∈ [c∗2, c∗2 + ζ].
Lemma 10. (Lemma 2 in Kuvshinov and Osipov (2018)).
Let c1 ∈ [c1, c1] find c2 ∈ [c2, c2] are such that M
c1
1 ∩
Ac2(ϑ) = ∅. Then S(c1, c′2) = 0 for all c′2 ∈ (c∗2, c2], where
c∗2 = c
m
2 (c1, c2) < c2.
Lemma 10 paves the way to the following algorithm.
Algorithm 2. Problem 7 solver.
(1) Input: c1 ∈ [c1, c1].
(2) Assign c2 ← c2.
(3) If c2 < c2 orM
c1
1 ∩Ac2(ϑ) = ∅, then exit: S(c1, ·) ≡ 0.
IFAC CAO 2018
Yekaterinburg, Russia, October 15-19, 2018
328
(4) If (M c11 ∩M
c2
2 )∩Ac2(ϑ) = ∅, then exit: S(c1, c2) = 1.
(5) Assign c2 ← cm2 (c1, c2).
(6) Repeat from (3).
Lemma 11. (Lemma 3 in Kuvshinov and Osipov (2018)).
If problem 7 does not have a solution then algorithm 2
establishes this fact after a finite number of iterations.
Lemma 12. (Lemma 4 in Kuvshinov and Osipov (2018)).
Suppose there is c′2 ∈ [c2, c2] such that S(c1, c′2) = 1 and
S(c1, c2) = 0 for all c2 ∈ (c′2, c2]. Then the sequence of
values c2 computed by algorithm 2 converges to c
′
2.
It seems improbable that in general case algorithm 2 will
reach the solution (c′2 from lemma 12) in finite number of
iterations. Consider two possibilities:
(1) M c22 ∩ Ac2(ϑ) = ∅. That implies W
c2
2 ∩ Ac2 = ∅,
thus step 5 of the algorithm may return the maximal
c2 reachable, in which case we’ll immediately get the
solution. Or we may fall into the second possibility.
(2) M c22 ∩Ac2(ϑ) = ∅. Due to convergence we can reach
M c1−η1 ∩ M
c2
2 ∩ Ac2(ϑ) = ∅ for any η > 0 in finite
number of iterations.
The results presented in this section make it possible to
propose algorithm 3. For convenience we assume a Boolean
function trace(T , W ) is defined, which tells whether there
is a motion x(t) (1) such that x(ϑ) ∈ T and (t, x(t)) /∈
intW for any t ∈ [t0, ϑ). If it is true then we have this
motion available as x(t). Due to lemma 6 we can write







Algorithm 3. Stackelberg motion approximation.
(1) Input: precision parameter tol > 0, parameters ζ > 0
and η ∈ (0, tol).
(2) Assign (l, u) ← (c1, c1).
(3) While u− l > tol, do:
(a) Assign c1 ← (l + u)/2.
(b) Assign c2 ← max{σ2(x) | (ϑ, x) ∈ G ∧ σ1(x) ≥
c1 }.
(c) Loop:





assign u ← c1, exit loop.




2 ), then assign l ← c1
(now we have the next approximation x(t)
with payoffs c1, c2), exit loop.
(iii) Assign cnext2 ← cm2 (c1, c2).
(iv) If c2 − cnext2 < ζ, then assign c1 ← c1 − η.
(v) If c1 ≤ l, then exit while.
(vi) Assign c2 ← cnext2 .
(4) The last approximation x(t) is the result.
An alternative may be to decrease c2 instead. That is
change (iv) to
(iv) If c2 − cnext2 < ζ, then assign cnext2 ← c2 − η.
We denote the first variant of the algorithm “Leader-c1”
and the alternative variant “Leader-c2”.
6. MODEL SYSTEM
Consider the system with the following dynamics:
ż1(t) = (ϑ− t)(F11(t) cosϕ(t)− F12(t) sinϕ(t) + F21(t)),
ż2(t) = (ϑ− t)(F11(t) sinϕ(t) + F12(t) cosϕ(t) + F22(t)),
z1(0) = −ρ0, z2(0) = 0.
Here the leader chooses (F11(t), F12(t)) given F
2
11(t) +
F 212(t) ≤ 1, and the follower chooses (F21(t), F22(t)) and
ϕ(t), given F 221(t) + F
2
22(t) ≤ 1 and |ϕ(t)| ≤ ϕ0.
Player payoffs are defined as:
I1 = −(z1(ϑ)− a1)2 − (z2(ϑ)− a2)2,
I2 = −z1(ϑ)2 − z2(ϑ)2.
Thus the leader’s objective is to get as close as possible to
point (a1, a2).
The set of admissible motions in this system can be
described analytically, see Osipov (2007) for details.
We consider three numerical algorithms:
• “Brent”: maximization of approximately computed
cmax1 (c2), c2 ∈ [c2, c2] using Brent’s method (a general
derivative-free scalar optimization method, see Brent
(1973)).
• “Grid”: maximization of cmax1 (ci2), ci2 = c2 + δi,
i = 0, N , where δ = (c2 − c2)/N by algorithm 1
proposed in section 4.
• “Leader” is algorithm 3 proposed in section 5,
cm2 (c1, c2) is approximated using binary search. It has
two variants: “Leader-c1” and “Leader-c2”.
Let ρ0 = 0.5, ϕ0 = π/4, ϑ = 1. We choose c1 = −a21 −
a22, c2 = γ2(0, (z1(0), z2(0))) = (1 − cosϕ0)ϑ2/2 − ρ0 ≈
−0.353553, c1 = c2 = 0. Binary search precision in all
cases is 10−4, in algorithm 3 parameters tol = η = ζ =
10−4. Grid size N = 104(c2 − c2) = 3536, so that the
grid step is approximately 10−4 too.
We consider three choices of (a1, a2) listed in table 1. Value
IS1 is the actual leader’s payoff on a Stackelberg solution.
All numerical methods except “Leader-c1” give the same
IN1 ≈ IS1 value in each case. This is not strange because
each method ultimately uses binary search to approximate
IS1 with the same bounds [c1, c1] and the same precision.
In each case absolute error IS1 − IN1 < 10−4 as it should
be.
Table 1. Solution precision: most methods







1 0.3 0.25 −0.050912 −0.050832 8 · 10−5
2 0.3 0.27 −0.056265 −0.056210 5.5 · 10−5
3 0.25 0 −0.021301 −0.021247 5.4 · 10−5
“Leader-c1” produces a bit different results presented in
table 2.
Table 2. Solution precision: “Leader-c1”







1 0.3 0.25 −0.050879 −0.050832 4.8 · 10−5
2 0.3 0.27 −0.056300 −0.056210 9 · 10−5
3 0.25 0 −0.021340 −0.021247 9.3 · 10−5
Table 3 presents follower’s payoffs and total amount of
evaluations of function trace (“trace” column) and func-
tions cmax1 (c2) or c
m
2 (c1, c2) (“evaluations” column) for all
combinations of a numerical method and (a1, a2) choice.
These functions contribute to trace evaluations as well due
to being approximated by binary search.
If we don’t remove nodes with too low upper bounds in
“Grid” method, then we get 42432 trace evaluations in
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(4) If (M c11 ∩M
c2
2 )∩Ac2(ϑ) = ∅, then exit: S(c1, c2) = 1.
(5) Assign c2 ← cm2 (c1, c2).
(6) Repeat from (3).
Lemma 11. (Lemma 3 in Kuvshinov and Osipov (2018)).
If problem 7 does not have a solution then algorithm 2
establishes this fact after a finite number of iterations.
Lemma 12. (Lemma 4 in Kuvshinov and Osipov (2018)).
Suppose there is c′2 ∈ [c2, c2] such that S(c1, c′2) = 1 and
S(c1, c2) = 0 for all c2 ∈ (c′2, c2]. Then the sequence of
values c2 computed by algorithm 2 converges to c
′
2.
It seems improbable that in general case algorithm 2 will
reach the solution (c′2 from lemma 12) in finite number of
iterations. Consider two possibilities:
(1) M c22 ∩ Ac2(ϑ) = ∅. That implies W
c2
2 ∩ Ac2 = ∅,
thus step 5 of the algorithm may return the maximal
c2 reachable, in which case we’ll immediately get the
solution. Or we may fall into the second possibility.
(2) M c22 ∩Ac2(ϑ) = ∅. Due to convergence we can reach
M c1−η1 ∩ M
c2
2 ∩ Ac2(ϑ) = ∅ for any η > 0 in finite
number of iterations.
The results presented in this section make it possible to
propose algorithm 3. For convenience we assume a Boolean
function trace(T , W ) is defined, which tells whether there
is a motion x(t) (1) such that x(ϑ) ∈ T and (t, x(t)) /∈
intW for any t ∈ [t0, ϑ). If it is true then we have this
motion available as x(t). Due to lemma 6 we can write







Algorithm 3. Stackelberg motion approximation.
(1) Input: precision parameter tol > 0, parameters ζ > 0
and η ∈ (0, tol).
(2) Assign (l, u) ← (c1, c1).
(3) While u− l > tol, do:
(a) Assign c1 ← (l + u)/2.
(b) Assign c2 ← max{σ2(x) | (ϑ, x) ∈ G ∧ σ1(x) ≥
c1 }.
(c) Loop:





assign u ← c1, exit loop.




2 ), then assign l ← c1
(now we have the next approximation x(t)
with payoffs c1, c2), exit loop.
(iii) Assign cnext2 ← cm2 (c1, c2).
(iv) If c2 − cnext2 < ζ, then assign c1 ← c1 − η.
(v) If c1 ≤ l, then exit while.
(vi) Assign c2 ← cnext2 .
(4) The last approximation x(t) is the result.
An alternative may be to decrease c2 instead. That is
change (iv) to
(iv) If c2 − cnext2 < ζ, then assign cnext2 ← c2 − η.
We denote the first variant of the algorithm “Leader-c1”
and the alternative variant “Leader-c2”.
6. MODEL SYSTEM
Consider the system with the following dynamics:
ż1(t) = (ϑ− t)(F11(t) cosϕ(t)− F12(t) sinϕ(t) + F21(t)),
ż2(t) = (ϑ− t)(F11(t) sinϕ(t) + F12(t) cosϕ(t) + F22(t)),
z1(0) = −ρ0, z2(0) = 0.
Here the leader chooses (F11(t), F12(t)) given F
2
11(t) +
F 212(t) ≤ 1, and the follower chooses (F21(t), F22(t)) and
ϕ(t), given F 221(t) + F
2
22(t) ≤ 1 and |ϕ(t)| ≤ ϕ0.
Player payoffs are defined as:
I1 = −(z1(ϑ)− a1)2 − (z2(ϑ)− a2)2,
I2 = −z1(ϑ)2 − z2(ϑ)2.
Thus the leader’s objective is to get as close as possible to
point (a1, a2).
The set of admissible motions in this system can be
described analytically, see Osipov (2007) for details.
We consider three numerical algorithms:
• “Brent”: maximization of approximately computed
cmax1 (c2), c2 ∈ [c2, c2] using Brent’s method (a general
derivative-free scalar optimization method, see Brent
(1973)).
• “Grid”: maximization of cmax1 (ci2), ci2 = c2 + δi,
i = 0, N , where δ = (c2 − c2)/N by algorithm 1
proposed in section 4.
• “Leader” is algorithm 3 proposed in section 5,
cm2 (c1, c2) is approximated using binary search. It has
two variants: “Leader-c1” and “Leader-c2”.
Let ρ0 = 0.5, ϕ0 = π/4, ϑ = 1. We choose c1 = −a21 −
a22, c2 = γ2(0, (z1(0), z2(0))) = (1 − cosϕ0)ϑ2/2 − ρ0 ≈
−0.353553, c1 = c2 = 0. Binary search precision in all
cases is 10−4, in algorithm 3 parameters tol = η = ζ =
10−4. Grid size N = 104(c2 − c2) = 3536, so that the
grid step is approximately 10−4 too.
We consider three choices of (a1, a2) listed in table 1. Value
IS1 is the actual leader’s payoff on a Stackelberg solution.
All numerical methods except “Leader-c1” give the same
IN1 ≈ IS1 value in each case. This is not strange because
each method ultimately uses binary search to approximate
IS1 with the same bounds [c1, c1] and the same precision.
In each case absolute error IS1 − IN1 < 10−4 as it should
be.
Table 1. Solution precision: most methods







1 0.3 0.25 −0.050912 −0.050832 8 · 10−5
2 0.3 0.27 −0.056265 −0.056210 5.5 · 10−5
3 0.25 0 −0.021301 −0.021247 5.4 · 10−5
“Leader-c1” produces a bit different results presented in
table 2.
Table 2. Solution precision: “Leader-c1”







1 0.3 0.25 −0.050879 −0.050832 4.8 · 10−5
2 0.3 0.27 −0.056300 −0.056210 9 · 10−5
3 0.25 0 −0.021340 −0.021247 9.3 · 10−5
Table 3 presents follower’s payoffs and total amount of
evaluations of function trace (“trace” column) and func-
tions cmax1 (c2) or c
m
2 (c1, c2) (“evaluations” column) for all
combinations of a numerical method and (a1, a2) choice.
These functions contribute to trace evaluations as well due
to being approximated by binary search.
If we don’t remove nodes with too low upper bounds in
“Grid” method, then we get 42432 trace evaluations in
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each case, which is several times worse than the proposed
variant. Still “Grid” method in this example is much
more computationally complex than other tested methods,
while “Brent” (a good general optimization method) is the
obvious winner here. This may result from the fact that
in this example cmax1 (c2) is actually a smooth unimodal
function, while our “Leader” method is designed in order
to provide the solution without any special assumptions
about properties of cmax1 (c2).
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